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In the last 20 years the within countries income inequality has continuously increased. This is a global 
phenomenon which is observable both advanced and developing countries. Excessive income and wealth 
inequalities played a role in the genesis of the recent financial crisis and may impair the recovery of the 
world economy. The long term trend of rising inequalities is the result of different forces. On the one side 
technological change modified the demand for labour in favour of skilled workers widening the skill 
premium  in  wages.  From  the  other  side,  globalization  in  trade  and  finance  have  contributed  to  the 
problem. In particular, fast financial liberalization seems to be a major source of increased inequalities. 
The huge expansion of financial flows in an international environment lacking adequate international 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms means the problems of global economic instability and growing 




1. The problem of the increase of income inequalities in the world economy  
Since  the  Industrial  Revolution,  the  history  of  the  world  economy  has  been 
characterized by a general rise in global inequality. This lengthy trend is the result of 
the interaction of two types of inequality: growing differences in GDP levels between 
countries (horizontal or inter-country inequality) and large differences in the income of 
individuals within each country (vertical or within-country inequality). During the first 
wave of globalization (1820-1914), although vertical inequality was high, horizontal 
inequality grew at a faster rate because industrialization in few core European countries 
initiated an uneven world development process leaving most of the other regions in the 
world  behind.  After  the  “first  globalization”  period,  in  1914-1945,  inter-country 
inequality continued to increase whilst income distribution inside countries was more 
even  (Lindert  and  Williamnson,  2001).  After  WWII,  in  the  Bretton  Woods  period 
(1944-1971), inequality between countries continued to rise, albeit at a slower pace 
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because of post-war reconstruction and growth in Japan and Western Europe, offset by 
the gradual inclusion in the core of the world economy of a group of new industrialized 
Asian countries, the so-called “Asian tigers”. These countries were able to increase their 
per-capita  income  and  reduce  poverty  through  export-led  strategies  supported  by 
controls on capital flows and domestic investments in capital goods, infrastructure and 
education. In the same period, within-country inequality remained stable overall with 
improvements in several advanced and Asian countries. From 1980, in the so-called 
“second  globalization”  era,  world  economic  and,  in  particular,  financial  integration 
accelerated, surpassing the already high level of the first phase of globalization in the 
years before WWI. Recently, the rapid growth of high-population countries such as 
China,  India  and  Brazil  as  well  as  of  other  Latin  American  and  South-East  Asian 
countries, has positively affected inter-country inequality but not within-country income 
inequality  which  is  now  rising  everywhere.  This  trend  in  within-country  income 
distribution,  common  to  both  developed  and  emerging  countries,  poses  several 
questions: does it have a positive or a negative impact on economic efficiency and 
social welfare? Is it an inevitable consequence of greater openness to trade and financial 
flows  in  emerging  and  developing  countries?  Does  it  depend  upon  continuous 
technological  change  spreading  all  over  the  world?  Is  it  the  consequence  of 
liberalization policies mainly driven by international economic institutions such as the 
WTO, the IMF and the World Bank? Did it have a role in the genesis of the recent 
financial crisis? Obviously, no simple answer to the above questions can be found and a 
set of simultaneous explanatory factors, rather than single factor explanations, must be 
taken into account to explain the worldwide trend in income distribution. Nonetheless, it 
is difficult to avoid the idea that some causal link between globalization in trade and 
finance, global imbalances, the financial crisis and inequality does exist. This chapter 
explains why current trends in income distribution cannot be ignored in the discussion 
of the causes of the financial crisis and their implication for the re-design of economic 
theory and the international order. After a discussion of empirical international evidence 
on within-country income distribution, we analyse the main factors that seem to be at 
the root of the income distribution problem, taking in account, among other things, the 
role that policies fostering financial liberalization may have had in the overall increase 
in income inequality.  
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From  the  point  of  view  of  economic  theory,  it  is  worth  noting  that,  unlike 
classical  economic  thought,  standard  neoclassical  economic  theory  treats  income 
distribution as a relatively minor issue. Assuming perfect competition, owners of the 
factors of production (labour, capital and land) are rewarded according to their marginal 
contribution to output. In this context, no conflicts over income distribution exist and 
changes  in  income  share  are  viewed  as  the  result  of  an  efficient  adjustment  of  the 
economy  to  technologically  induced  structural  changes  or  to  new  market  equilibria 
driven  by  demand  or  supply  shocks.  From  this,  it  follows  that  changes  in  income 
distribution are not a problem per se. In the neo-classical paradigm, the Heckscher-
Ohlin model of international trade (H-O) is one notable exception, in that it predicts 
unambiguous and sharp distributional effects in countries that open up to trade. In the 
H-O model, greater openness to international trade increases the real income of the 
country’s  abundant  factor  of  production  intensively  employed  in  the  production  of 
exported  goods.  At  the  same  time,  the  real  income  of  owners  of  the  scarce  factor 
decreases, so that the group damaged by international trade is likely to oppose any move 
toward  free  trade,  calling  for  some  form  of  protection  from  foreign  competition. 
Domestic  income  remuneration  policies  may  therefore  be  necessary  to  convince 
international  trade  ‘losers’  to  give  up  their  opposition  to  free  trade,  allowing  the 
economy to move toward an international Pareto superior equilibrium. Because of these 
predictions, the H-O theory is sometimes invoked as a possible explanation for the 
worldwide trend in rising income inequality. However, as we shall show later in this 
chapter, the actual trends in income distribution are not consistent with the ‘naïve’ H-O 
view and other explanations need to be found. 
  Moving away from the narrow static neoclassical world, studies of economic 
development pay more attention to income inequality. The reason is that developing 
countries undergo structural change in their institutions, the labour market and their 
economic structure, which affect the incomes of different segments of the population in 
non-uniform ways. The final goal of economic development should be the achievement 
of better living conditions for populations that are often locked into a poverty trap. 
However, a high rate of GDP growth does not necessarily mean greater welfare for 
everybody: it may lead to an improvement in the living standards of the majority of the 
population and to lower inequality or, on the contrary, it may lead to a growing share of  
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domestic  GDP  going  to  a  small  elite  without  any  real  benefit  to  the  poor.  The 
distributional  consequences  of  different  development  policies  cannot  be  ignored  as 
shown by a large body of literatures on this topic, effectively summarized by Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2007). 
  In developed countries, a growing interest in the theme of income distribution 
was evident in the USA at the beginning of the 2000s, well before the start of the 
financial crisis (Bryan and Martinez, 2008; Lawrence, 2008). Subsequently, after 2008 a 
lively discussion took place on the role of US income inequality in the genesis of the 
financial crisis (Reich, 2010). At a more general level, official reports published by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2008), and OECD (2008, 2011a, 2011b) not 
only show beyond any doubt that the recent period of globalization has also been a 
period of rising inequalities, but also indicate that the problem of income inequality has 
become a concern for important international economic institutions often criticised for 
the  support  they  have  given  in  the  past  to  the  ‘Washington  Consensus’  ideology 
(Stiglitz, 2002) . 
  Why should we be concerned about income inequalities? After all, a degree of 
inequality  is  acceptable  and  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  high  wages  are  the 
consequence  of  high  productivity  of  labour  which  has  to  be  properly  rewarded, 
according to the neoclassical view. Since the labour force is a heterogeneous aggregate 
comprising individuals with different skills and levels of education, it is likely that 
different individuals will have different rates of productivity and hence obtain different 
rewards as described by Murnane et al. (1995). Therefore, if the composition of the 
labour  force  changes  and  labour  demand  switches  in  favour  of  more  educated  and 
skilled workers, the gap between high and low wages will probably increase. As shown 
in the next section, the problem is that the gap between low and high income individuals 
has, in several cases, gone well beyond any reasonable and socially acceptable level. 
Having said that, the social perception of excessive inequality is not sufficient, on its 
own,  to  justify  concern  about  its  potential  negative  economic  consequences:  other 
factors are in play. For example, in the case of developing and emerging countries, 
excessive income inequality is often correlated with corruption and poverty problems 
that may hinder both growth and the modernization of the economy. In fact, there is 
evidence that ‘…longer growth spells are robustly associated with more equality in the  
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income distribution’ (Berg and Ostry, 2011) and that equality is beneficial to the long-
run  sustainability  of  growth.  At  a  more  general  level,  one  concern  about  income 
inequalities  is  that  wherever  income  and  wealth  are  unequally  distributed  and 
concentrated, democracy is emptied of any real content, because the growing costs of 
election campaigns mean that only the wealthy can afford to run for political office. As 
in the past, personal income, rather than citizenship, becomes the prerequisite for taking 
an active part in the political life of a country. In addition, it is well-known that the 
wealthiest people and corporations are very often able to influence policy decisions 
through the ownership of the media and via lobbying, unfairly promoting their interests.  
Another  problem  which  is  particularly  relevant  today  in  advanced  countries 
severely hit by the recent global financial crisis, is that an excessive concentration of 
income  and  wealth  in  the  hands  of  the  upper  echelons  of  a  society  may  depress 
aggregate  demand,  generating  economic  stagnation  and  inducing  low  income 
households and individuals to become increasingly indebted.  
In general, the propensities to save or consume from disposable income are not 
uniform across households and individuals but vary with the income level. High income 
households have a greater propensity to save whereas low-income households consume 
a larger proportion of their incomes (Dyan et al., 2004). In formal terms, if we call the 
consumption propensity of low income households !! and the consumption propensity 
of high income households !!, assuming that !! ! !!, we may show that the impact on 
aggregate consumption C of changes in the national income share α of low income 
households is positive.  
Let us consider a simple closed Keynesian economy where two different types 
of  consumers  and  households  live:  low  income  households !! and  high  income 
households !!. From the macroeconomic point of view the difference between the two 
household  types  consists  in  their  consumption  (and  savings)  propensity.  The  basic 
assumption is that the consumption propensity of the !! group !! is greater than the 
consumption  propensity  of  the !!  group !! .  As  a  consequence,  the  aggregate 
consumption expenditure is a weighted average of the consumption of the two groups. 
The first step is to break down aggregate consumption into two parts, recalling 
that  total  consumption  is  simply  the  sum  of  consumption  from  the  two  households 
groups:  
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(1)    ! ! !!! ! ! !!! !  !! ! !! ! !!!!! ! !!!!! 
(2)    !! ! !! 
 
The share of domestic income Y that goes to the !! is α so income can also be 
broken down as follows: 
 
(3)    ! ! ! ! ! ! !   
(4)    ! ! ! !"  
(5)    ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
 
  By replacing (A.4) and (A.5) in (A.1), aggregate consumption can be written as 
 
(6)    ! ! !!!" ! !! ! ! ! ! ! !!! ! !! ! ! ! ! 
 
Equation (A.6) may now be differentiated to compute the effect of changes in 
the income distribution parameter α on C: 
 
(7)   
!"
!" ! !! ! !! ! ! ! 
 
The partial derivative of aggregate consumption C with respect to the !! income 
share α  is positive because of assumption (2). The main economic implication of (7) is 
that a shift of income distribution unfavourable to the !! group, namely a decrease in α, 
has a negative impact on consumption. 
  In fact, according to (7) a lower α, namely a higher proportion of GDP in the 
hands of wealthy households, depresses aggregate consumption. If income distribution 
changes in favour of the upper segment of society (a decrease in α) but in the same time 
GDP growths at a sufficient rate, consumption may still increase because the higher per-
capita income may offset the income distribution changes. However, in the case of weak 
economic growth or particularly adverse distributional changes, aggregate consumption 
cannot  increase  in  the  same  proportion  as  GDP,  unless  lower  income  households  
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finance part of their consumption with debt. If enough credit is available, the outcome 
can be greater and greater private debt, or, if credit to households is constrained, the 
eventual  reduction  of  the  growth  rate  and  economic  stagnation  due  to  declining 
aggregate demand. In its simplicity, this resembles some features of the US economy 
prior to and after the financial crisis: growing income inequality characterized by a 
rising concentration of wealth at the very top, the increasing indebtedness of households, 
a credit bubble that eventually burst followed by a period of stagnant domestic demand 
and an uncertain economic outlook (Wolff, 2010). 
 
2. Empirical evidence about trends in within-country income distribution 
  Statistical studies usually rely on synthetic concentration indices calculated from 
national  income  data  and  surveys,  consumption  and  the  wages  of  households  or 
individuals, depending on reliability and availability. Of the inequality measures, the 
Gini index
2 and ratios between quintile or decile of the income distribution, such as the 
D10/D1 or the Q5/Q1 (often along with intermediate ratio such as D10/D5 and D5/D1) 
are among the most used. The Gini index takes values in the range between 0 and 1 (or 
in percentage terms between 0 and 100), with 1 (100) representing the highest and 0 the 
lowest inequality. If the index were equal to 0, all individual in a country would have 
the same identical income (a full egalitarian society!). On the other hand, if the index 
were equal to 1, all domestic income would go to just one individual. As a consequence, 
an  upward  movement  of  the  coefficient  signals  rising  inequality.  The  international 
comparison of the Gini index and the ranking of countries according to their degree of 
inequality  is  possible  but  problematic  due  to  measurement  errors  and  because  the 
sources, quality and reliability of domestic data may differ from one country to another. 
To  facilitate  comparative  analysis,  efforts  have  been  made  to  create  homogenous 
international  databases  on  income  distribution  by  the  OECD,  UN,  ILO  and  other 
research institutes such as the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) and the 
                                                 
2 The Gini index was developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini in 1912 and is closely related to 
the Lorentz Curve, a graphic representation of income distribution in which individuals are ordered 
bottom to top on the horizontal axis according to their income, while cumulative income is measured on 
the vertical axis. In particular, the Gini index represents the ratio of the area between the Lorentz Curve 
and the diagonal of the graph (equidistribution line) and the area of maximum concentration of income, 
equal to the whole area below the equidistribution line. A practical guide to the use and calculation of the 
Gini index can be found at http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/329/gini_index_040EN.pdf.  
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Cross  National  Data  Center  in  Luxemburg  (LIS).  The  empirical  evidence  discussed 
below draws on such databases. 
It is good practice to use both Gini coefficients and distribution ratios, because 
the same Gini index may be associated with different underlying income distributions 
more easily identified with the help of intermediate ratios. For example, a higher Gini 
index due to a larger D5/D1 ratio is likely to represent a less problematic situation than 
when the increase is the result of a higher D10/D5 ratio because, in this case, there is a 
higher concentration of income in the hands of relatively few people at the expense of 
the middle class which, in today’s societies, comprises the majority of the population. 
Hence, the information given by distribution ratios is generally a useful complement to 
the Gini index. 
The economic literature is unanimous in identifying greater inequality in within-
country income distribution over the last two decades (Cornia, 2003; Berg and Ostry, 
2011;  Bergh  and  Nilsson,  2010;  Bollè,  2008;  Celik  and  Basdas,  2010;  Dreher  and 
Gaston,2008;  Goldberg  and  Pavcnik,  2007;  Jauomotte  et  al.,  2008;  Palma,  2006; 
Qureshi  and  Wan,  2008;  Ulubasoglu,  2004)  and  in  attribution  this  trend  to  the 
concentration of income at the top of the distribution curve. Two wide-ranging and 
authoritative studies by the OECD (2008) and ILO (2008) are illustrative in this regard.  
According to the OECD (2008: 17), wide differences in the absolute level of 
inequality between countries exist, as Table 1 shows, but income inequality in the last 
two decades has risen in two-thirds of all OECD countries. This is shown in Table 2 
with the Gini index for pre-tax market incomes in 15 OECD countries. In the Table, the 
index is normalized to 1 in a base year that may be 1975, 1985 or 1995 depending on 
available data in each country The Table therefore shows changes compared to the 
starting year, rather than the absolute values of the index. Inequality has increased the 
most  in  Canada,  Germany,  the  USA,  Italy  and  Finland.  A  slight  decrease  occurred 
recently in the UK and Australia. On average, in this OECD sample, inequality, as 
measured by the index, increased by 12% in the period 1985-2005. It is worth noting 
that, according to the OECD, the rise in inequality is mainly due to wealthy households 
improving their position with respect to middle-class and poor families. In fact, taking 
the sample of 22 OECD nations as a whole, the average annual change in the real 
income of households at the top quintile of the distribution was 2.1% in the period  
  9 
1985-1995  and  1.9%  in  the  subsequent  decade.  In  contrast,  the  real  income  of 
households at the bottom quintile grew by 1.2% in the first decade and 1.5% in the 
decade 1995-2005 (OECD, 2008: 29).  
The general trends that emerge from the OECD study are particularly evident in 
the case of the USA and are confirmed by other statistical sources. For example, using 
data  from  the  UNI/WIDER  Income  Inequality  Database  WIID2c  (2008),  Figure  1 
shows the absolute values of the Gini index from 1968 to 2004 and Table 3 shows 
Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3 and Q3/Q1 ratios.  
The graph shows a steady increase in overall income inequality in the USA from 
1980. The index is very high for a developed country (Table 1). At the same time, the 
inter distribution ratios of Table 3 show a clear concentration of income in favour of the 
top quintile representing the top 20% of US earners. Interestingly, while the Q3/Q1 
ratio  did  not  change  much  over  the  period,  both  the  Q5/Q1  and  Q5/Q3  ratios 
continuously rose. The rise in the income share of the top 1% of earners is unsurprising. 
Table 4 shows that the improvement in the position of the wealthiest portion of the 
population is particularly clear in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom  and  USA.  In  the  USA,  the  concentration  of  income  in  the  hands  of  the 
wealthiest portion of the population has recently returned to the very high levels prior to 
the 1929 crisis (Figure 2). Although caution is required in drawing inferences from this, 
one question is unavoidable: is it a coincidence that in the years before both the 1929 
and 2008 crisis income inequality was very high in the USA? 
The information on inequalities provided by the OECD is confirmed by a recent 
update (OECD, 2011a) and by the Labour Organization International (2008) Report on 
‘Income Inequalities in the Age of Globalization’. In this Report, the ILO analyses 
income distribution changes in countries at different development stages, based on a 
sample of 73 countries (more than in the OECD study). The main conclusions are the 
same: inequality has been growing in two thirds of the countries, whether developed or 
developing  (ILO,  2008:  1).  The  ILO  Report  also  contains  important  additional 
information on another worrisome phenomenon, namely the decrease of the share of 
national income that goes to wages and therefore to labour. According to ILO estimates, 
in 51 countries in the sample, the wage share of domestic income has decreased since  
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1990, falling by 13% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 10% in Asia and the Pacific 
and 9% in the Advanced Economies (ILO, 2088: 6).  
The decrease in the wage share is closely related to the fact that wage growth 
generally did not keep pace with productivity improvements. For instance, based on 
National Bureau of Economic Analysis data, Lawrence (2008) shows that from 1980 to 
2006, in the USA, labour productivity grew by 70% while real hourly wages rose by a 
mere 4.4%! ILO (2008: 7) analysed a reduced sample of 32 countries
3 for which data on 
productivity and wages were available, finding that in 24 countries productivity growth 
exceeded wage growth in the period 1990-2006. Notable exceptions were China and 
South Africa where wages performed quite well
4. It is not difficult to understand that 
when the output per worker grows faster than wages, the wage share declines in favour 
of corporate profits and financial rents. Since white and blue collar workers are the 
majority of the population, the negative consequences for aggregate consumption are 
obvious, as explained in the previous section.  
Another fact, particularly evident in the USA and stressed by Lawrence (2008), 
is that the financial sector was where the profit share grew the most at the expenses of 
wages so a redistribution inside the corporate sector in favour of financial companies 
also seems to have taken place, in addition to the redistribution between labour and 
corporations. This observation leads to a related aspect of the inequality issue: not all 
workers have been hit in the same manner by the fall in income share going to wages 
because an additional feature of the recent increase in inequality is the widening of the 
gap between high-wage and low-wage earners. Of course, jobs and pay cannot be equal 
in view of the technological features of production processes, the composition of the 
labour  force,  and  the  duties  of  workers  and  skills  required  by  firms  operating  in 
different industries. We expect skilled workers to earn more than unskilled workers so 
that wage differences are not a surprise. What is surprising is the extent to which the 
gap has widened in the recent past. A common measure of the wage gap is the ratio 
between  the  pay  of  company  executives  and  average  employee  wages,  which  has 
                                                 
3 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, 
Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, UK, USA. 
4 On the contrary, in other BRICS countries such as Brazil, India and Russia, productivity growth was 
much higher than wage growth.  
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reached levels that are difficult to justify on the grounds of economic efficiency. In 
2007, at the onset of the international financial crisis, for CEOs the ratio ranged from 71 
in the Netherlands to 183 in the USA, while in the case of average executives it was 43 
and 112 respectively (ILO, 2008: 17). The latter estimates are downward biased because 
they  do  not  include  share-based  remuneration  that  actually  forms  up  to  90%  of 
executives and CEO’s earnings. The practice of share-based remuneration and bonuses 
is based on the idea that if pay is linked to the economic performance of the company, 
employees  are  better  motivated  to  find  strategies  and  take  actions  that  improve  the 
market value of the firms. In many cases, however, that practice has led to distortions 
resulting in an excessive focus on short-term economic performance rather than long 
run strategies capable of producing stable growth. This distortion was evident for banks 
and financial companies and contributed to the mechanism that led to the sub-prime 
mortgage bubble in the USA. Another distortion is that decisions about the amount of 
bonuses given to executives and CEOs are often taken by the CEOs themselves, so that 
the level of share-based remuneration is often unrelated to actual economic performance. 
The  results  of  empirically  analysing  the  link  between  company  performance  and 
executive  pay  in  different  countries  are  uneven  and,  on  the  basis  of  an  extensive 
analysis of the existing literature, the ILO (2008: 57) concludes that: ‘overall, a stable 
and  significant  relation  between  pay  and  performance  has  yet  to  be  established’. 
However,  the  practice  of  paying  executives  with  shares  and  stock  options  was 
widespread in the years before the sub-prime mortgage crisis, particularly in financial 
companies, and apparently persists even after the bursting of the credit bubble in the 
USA, despite very negative public opinion and protests caused by the huge bonuses 
handed out in the middle of the crisis to AIG and other company executives involved in 
the financial melt-down of 2007-2008
5. When the share and stock option components of 
executive pay are taken into account, the wage gap skyrockets. In the USA, the ratio 
between executive pay and average pay was 370 in 2003 but had almost doubled four 
years later, reaching 521 in 2007. The case of the USA is extreme but not exceptional; 
similar trends can be observed in other advanced and emerging countries.  
So far we have discussed trends in income distribution. However, the wealth of 
individuals and households also plays an important role in consumption and savings 
                                                 
5 In 2008, Wall Street executives earned $18 billion in bonuses (The New York Times, 2011).  
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decisions, affecting living standards. Consumption depends not only on income, but 
also on the ownership of houses and financial assets such as bonds, shares and stock 
options.  We  have  just  seen  how,  in  recent  years,  stock  options  have  increasingly 
become a significant part of the remuneration of executives and CEO: inequality in 
overall wealth distribution cannot be ignored. In this regard, empirical research shows 
that  wealth  inequality  is  correlated  to  and  larger  than  income  inequality.  In  a 
groundbreaking  article,  James  B.  Davies  et  al.  (2011)  computed  the  level  and 
distribution of world household wealth in the year 2000 and obtained an estimate of the 
global  Gini  index  equal  to  0.802.  That  is  very  high  compared  to  coefficients  for 
disposable income in individual countries which typically range between 0.3 and 0.5. 
Looking at the shape of the wealth distribution, they also found that people at the top 
and very top of the distribution (10%, 5% and 1% decile and percentile) respectively 
hold 70.7%, 56.7% and 31.6% of the world’s wealth. No clear differences in wealth 
inequality  patterns  among  developed,  low  income  and  medium  income  emerging 
countries arose from their study. An international comparison between countries reveals 
that the USA scores first in wealth inequality with a Gini index equal to 0.801, a higher 
value  than  that  of  developing  and  emerging  countries  such  as  Bangladesh  (0.660), 
Indonesia (0.764), Nigeria (0.736), China (0.550) and India (0.669). When we compare 
wealth distribution in countries at different levels of development, obviously we need to 
remember that absolute levels of poverty and wealth may differ by a large extent and 
that medium income or even low income people in advanced countries are often better 
off  than  many  wealthy  people  in  poor  countries.  Nonetheless,  the  fact  that  wealth 
inequality  in  the  most  advanced  country  of  the  world  exceeds  that  of  very  poor 
countries  where  economic  inefficiency,  unemployment  and  political  corruption  are 
often endemic is something that could be considered scandalous.  
In the end, what emerges from a large body of empirical evidence is an ongoing 
process of income and wealth concentration at the core as well as in the periphery of the 
world economy. There is also evidence that excessive income and wealth inequalities 
contributed  to  the  financial  crisis  in  the  USA  (Rajan,  2010;  Reich,  2010).  Finally, 
inequality is increasingly seen as a problem that may hinder the recovery of the world 
economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis (OECD, 2011) and reduce the long-term 
sustainability of growth in developing countries (Berg and Ostry, 2011).  
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3. Why has within-country income inequality increased?  
Why have economic inequalities increased in the ‘second globalization’ era? It 
is important to answer this question if we want to design correct economic policies 
aimed at reducing the negative impact of inequality and, if possible, reverse the trend. In 
the last 25 years, globalization has grown alongside inequality, making it an automatic 
suspect. Some tests, examining the hypothesis that globalisation is per se responsible 
for  growing  inequalities,  regress  income  distribution  data  on  aggregate  indices 
supposedly  capturing  the  main  features  of  globalization  (Bergh  and  Nilsson,  2010; 
Dreher and Gaston, 2008). However, globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon with 
trade, financial and political aspects that often tend to affect income distribution in 
different directions and have different strengths so that in the literature other studies 
have tried to isolate and test the impact on inequality of the different components of 
globalization separately (Berg and Ostry, 2011; Celik and Basdas, 2010; Cornia, 2003; 
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; Jauomotte et al., 2008; Palma, 2006; Qureshi and Wan, 
2008; Ulubasoglu, 2004). 
In  the  Bretton  Woods  era,  under  the  institutional  framework  of  GATT 
negotiations,  world  trade  expanded  greatly,  particularly  between  advanced  nations. 
States became more and more open to international trade and within-country income 
inequalities were generally constant or decreased. It is worth remembering that in this 
period,  governments  maintained  controls  on  international  capital  movements  in  an 
environment characterized by fixed exchange rates. After 1971, with the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system and the start of the dollar standard era, the liberalization of 
world trade continued but financial liberalization was the chief innovation in the period. 
The move toward full economic and financial liberalization was forcefully promoted by 
advanced countries and endorsed by international institutions, such as the IMF and WB, 
prompting  developing  countries  to  introduce  domestic  reforms  aimed  at  liberalizing 
their  economies  and  opening  their  domestic  market  not  only  to  trade  but  also  to 
financial flows: so-called ‘capital account liberalization’. The implementation of the set 
of  neo-liberalistic  monetary  and  economic  policy  prescriptions  known  as  the 
‘Washington  Consensus’,  after  Williamson  (1990),  was  supposed  to  be  the  key  to 
successful economic development. However, the cluster of financial crises and bursting  
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bubbles in several countries in the 1990s and the 2000s, along with the rise in within-
country income inequality, cast serious doubt on the validity of Washington Consensus 
prescriptions and gave rise to serious criticisms of the IMF and WB policies, leading to 
proposed  reforms  of  leading  international  economic  institutions  (Bird,  2001;  Florio, 
2002; Przesworski and Wreeland, 2002; Bordo, 2000). The sequence of crisis that hit 
the world economy in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s includes: Argentina 
(1991),  Mexico  (1994),  the  Asian  crisis  (1997,  1998),  Brazil  (1998,  1999),  Russia 
(1998), Turkey (2000), Argentina (2001). We should also recall the dramatic fall in 
GDP of Russia and other Eastern Europe countries, which -  in the first half of the1990s 
-  attempted  to  speed  up  the  transition  from  planned  to  free  market  economies  by 
implementing the rapid reforms and liberalization known as ‘shock therapy’ (Lawrence 
Klein and Marshall Pomer, 2001). On the whole, financial liberalization policies have 
not produced the positive impact on growth that its supporters expected. On the contrary, 
as  Rodrik  and  Subramanian  (2009)  clearly  show,  no  correlation  between  economic 
growth and financial liberalization in developing countries exists, so that the case in 
favour of the latter was clearly overstated. At the same time, according to other studies, 
the  idea  that  capital  account  liberalization  is  associated  with  an  increase  in  income 
inequality cannot easily be discarded. In any case, the literature confirms the idea that it 
is useful to separately asses the impacts of the different components of globalization 
(trade, finance, technology) on income inequality, even where they are interconnected, 
as  in  the  case  of  trade  and  technological  change,  as  discussed  below.  Table  5 
summarizes the key result of selected studies about globalization and within-country 
income inequality. 
 
4. Technological change and inequality 
The hypothesis that technological change widens the wage gap is accredited by 
many and is generally accepted (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). Certainly, one of the 
most  important  events  in  the  last  fifteen  years  has  been  the  accelerated  pace  of 
technological progress due to the revolution in ICT. Jorgenson and Vu (2005) estimate 
that on average, at the world level, the contribution of ICT capital goods to economic 
growth increased from 10% in 1989-1995 to 15% in 1995-2003. The role of ICT capital 
goods as a source of growth was particularly important in the case of the advanced G7  
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countries, where its contribution jumped from 17% to 27%. However, a similar trend is 
also evident in seven major developing and transition economies (Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, South Korea) where the percentage of economic growth due 
to the accumulation of ICT capital goods doubled, from 4% to 8%. In this country 
group, the experience of Brazil (up from 4% to 23%) was particularly striking. Almost 
everywhere in the world, the share of investments in ICT capital goods increased with 
important consequences on the organization of production and the demand for labour. 
New  technologies  made  it  easier  for  corporations  to  split  production  processes  into 
separate  stages  that  could  then  be  outsourced  and  moved  to  other  countries. 
Corporations  in  advanced  countries  found  it  convenient  to  locate  the  more  labour 
intensive  phases  of  production  processes  in  less  developed  countries  with  a  cheap 
labour  force,  whilst  keeping  at  home  design,  research  and  development  as  well  as 
retaining  financial  and  technical  control  over  the  entire  production  process.  The 
consequence  on  the  labour  market,  in  advanced  countries,  has  been  a  widespread 
increase in the demand for skilled workers and, at the same time, a reduction in the 
demand for the unskilled. For this reason, differences in skills may explain differences 
in earnings (Devroye and Freeman, 2001).  
When we talk about skills, it is useful to refer to the classification of working 
functions  proposed  by  Author  et  al.  (2001).  They  identify  five  categories,  ranked 
according  to  knowledge  content  and  complexity:  routine  manual,  routine  cognitive, 
non-routine manual, non-routine interactive and non-routine analytic. Routine manual 
functions do not require workers to have a particularly high level of education, while 
people engaged in non-routine analytic activities needs problem-solving capabilities that 
can be acquired only through years of education and experience. Jobs in factories where 
workers assemble cars or toys are an example of simple routine manual activities that 
are  increasingly  displaced  by  investment  in  the  automation  and  informatisation  of 
production. Employees in marketing departments devising communications strategies 
for the sale of new products are an example of workers engaged in non-routine analytic 
functions. Because of technological progress, the historical trend in the last thirty years 
has been that of a steady reduction in the demand for routine functions and a continuous 
increase in the demand for the more knowledge-intensive non-routine functions. The 
development of a knowledge society necessarily involves these trends in labour demand.  
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An obvious consequence, therefore, is that remuneration for non-routine tasks increases 
compared  to  routine  functions.  Inside  firms,  many  routine  manual  functions,  once 
assigned  to  unskilled  workers,  are  carried  out  by  computers  or  robots,  or  else  in 
factories  located  in  less  developed  countries  (LDCs)  where  hourly  remuneration  is 
much lower than in developed economies. In the latter group of countries, therefore, the 
ICT revolution increased the productivity of the labour factor enormously and produced 
a ‘skill biased’ change in wage structures, widening the gap, not only between low and 
high pay, but also between blue and white collar workers (Lawrence, 2008). Therefore 
the rising skills and wage gap depends on two elements: a technology-propelled surge in 
the demand for non-routine tasks and skilled workers alongside downward pressure on 
the pay of individuals employed in routine tasks under the threat of unemployment and 
job  dislocation  in  foreign  countries.  Changes  in  the  production  organization  of 
corporations through technological progress may, therefore, explain part of the increase 
in income inequality in developed countries. What still cannot be explained under the 
heading of the ICT revolution is the excessive concentration of income at the top of the 
distribution curve and the abnormal increase in the remuneration of the top executives 
mentioned in the previous section. After all, the gap in wages and salaries due to the 
skill-biased change in the demand for labour is nothing but a ‘premium’ for knowledge, 
while the dramatic increase in the gap between top executive remuneration and average 
workers  wages  seems  to  be  more  the  result  of  CEO  greed,  the  decision-making 
mechanism inside companies and the powers of Boards of Directors, rather than a direct 
consequence of above average company performances (ILO, 2008). 
What  can  we  say  about  the  impact  of  technological  change  on  income 
distribution in emerging or LDCs? From the above, inequalities could be expected to 
decrease because of an improvement in the salaries of unskilled workers, supposedly the 
‘abundant factor of production’ in these economies. If multinational companies invest in 
LDCs, buying or building factories in order to exploit abundant cheap labour in these 
countries,  the  demand  for  routine  manual  and  cognitive  positions  should  rise  and 
consequently  also  the  remuneration  for  these  tasks.  In  the  end,  higher  wages  of 
unskilled workers should reduce inequality. On the contrary, as shown in section 2, 
income inequality increased in both LDCs and emerging countries. The prediction of 
decreasing  inequality  through  stronger  demand  for  unskilled  labour  is  naïve  and  
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inaccurate because technological progress also increases the demand for skills and non-
routine functions in LDCs, as elsewhere. In this regard, in their review of the literature 
on  the  distributional  effects  of  globalization  in  developing  countries,  Goldberg  and 
Pavcnik (2007: 52) conclude that ‘when we consider the 1980s and the 1990s as a 
whole, all countries seem to have experienced increases in the skill premium’. They also 
observe that ‘interestingly, the skill premium increases seem to chronologically coincide 
with  the  trade  reforms  in  several  countries’.  This  observation  raises  the  important 
question of the role neoliberal political and institutional reforms may have had in the 
inequality story. We shall return to it later on in this chapter. 
One  explanation  for  the  widening  wage  gap  in  emerging  and  developing 
countries  is  that  domestic  investments  and  FDIs  in  these  countries  have  led  to  the 
adoption of improved technologies. In other words, emerging countries have reduced 
the distance from the technological frontier and are no more simply dumping grounds 
for the obsolete technologies of advances countries. Through FDIs, when new capital 
goods  and  equipment  are  put  to  work  in  plants  producing  intermediate  goods, 
multinational companies actually transfer technology to LDCs. FDIs and outsourcing in 
LDCs  are  therefore  important  parts  of  the  explanation  for  the  skill-bias  determined 
wage gap (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). The technological intensity of new factories in 
developing countries may be below that of factories in developed economies but it is 
higher than previous levels so in emerging economies too a skill bias in the demand for 
labour arises. Even if the type of skills that corporations demand in developed countries 
were systematically different from the skills they need in developing economies, the 
result would be the same: everywhere technological progress would shift demand for 
labour toward a larger portion of more highly educated and skilled workers. The bottom 
line is that widespread technological change may negatively affect income distribution 
in both LDCs and emerging countries (Jauomott et al., 2008; OECD, 2008, 2011a). 
 
5. International trade and inequality 
Globalization  is  a  consequence  of  free  trade.  The  degree  of  openness  to 
international  trade  is  a  common  measure  of  globalization  and  as  such  became  an 
explanatory variable in several empirical tests of the causes of income inequality. Why 
should international trade affect within-country income distribution at all? International  
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trade theory provides one possible answer. According to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin 
model, greater openness to international trade should improve the marginal productivity 
of  the  country’s  abundant  factor  of  production  and  therefore  its  real  income.  If  we 
believe that skilled labour is abundant in advanced countries, while unskilled (or less 
skilled) labour is abundant in LCDs and emerging countries, then the straightforward 
application  of  this  theory  leads  to  one  conclusion  alone:  greater  openness  to 
international trade (trade globalization) should increase the wages of skilled workers in 
developed countries and of unskilled workers in developing countries. The other side of 
the coin is that unskilled workers in advanced countries and skilled workers in LDCs 
should  suffer  from  decreasing  real  wages.  In  this  view,  the  wage  gap  increases  in 
advanced  economies  and  decreases  elsewhere.  However,  while  there  has  been  a 
deterioration of the income position of unskilled workers in advanced countries, the 
same thing is not happening to skilled workers in developing and emerging economies. 
If trade has anything to do with income distribution, other explanations have to be 
found. 
The  previous  section  discusses  how  changes  in  demand  for  skills  due  to 
technological progress explain part of the recent worldwide trend in income inequality. 
Here  we  stress  how  the  interaction  between  trade  globalization  and  technological 
changes adds another element to the explanation of rising income inequalities. Trade 
globalization  involves  the  adoption  of  policies  aimed  at  reducing  and  eliminating 
obstacles to trade such as tariffs or import quotas. At the same time, less protection 
leads to the expansion of the tradeable sector of the economy exposed to international 
competition,  comprising  modern  export-oriented  firms  often  specializing  in  the 
production of intermediate goods. If a dualistic structure emerges, inequalities are very 
likely to increase. 
International  trade  offers  opportunities  to  developing  countries  but  raises 
competitive pressure on firms; only the most efficient can survive. In order to do so, 
companies in the tradeable sector producing finished goods must re-organize and invest 
in new technologies. Consequently, their demand for skills changes in favour of non-
routine  functions.  As  the  tradeable  sector  expands,  the  wages  of  employees  in  that 
sector rise with respect to wages in the non-tradeable sector and the wage gap widens. 
In addition, companies in the tradeable sector of emerging countries produce and/or  
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assemble  intermediate  goods  for  foreign  multinationals.  International  outsourcing  of 
production creates international trade and contributes to the growth of the tradeable 
sector  in  LDCs.  Technological  progress,  trade  globalization  and  outsourcing  by 
multinationals interact and work in the same direction.  
However, trade globalization is not always associated with inequality. After all, 
in the Bretton Woods era and in the 1970s, within-country inequality either increased 
only slightly or, frequently, decreased as the volume of international trade continually 
rose. This is the experience of the European countries that liberalized trade in the 1960s, 
creating the EEC. According to the OECD WIID2C database, for example in France the 
Gini index was 52 in 1962 but was 34 in 1970. In the same period it was fairly stable in 
Germany, at around 38. Another well-known example is that of the Asian countries that 
globalized trade in the 1960s and 1970s. Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan did not 
experience increases in income inequality until the 1980s (Cornia, 2003). However, 
inequality grew in several Latin America Countries that liberalized trade in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Wood, 1999). Different domestic approaches to political reforms and the 
timing of liberalization may account for this difference. After 1980, trade liberalization 
was  often  accompanied  by  privatization,  labour  market  reforms  and  financial 
liberalization. On the other hand, in the 1960s and 1970s, Asian countries did not open 
their domestic financial markets and when, in the 1990s, they did, they were hit by the 
severe  financial  crisis  of  1997-1998.  It  is  difficult  to  separate  the  impact  of  trade 
globalization  on  inequality  from  the  effects  of  political  and  institutional  reforms 
accompanying globalization, but the suspicion is that reforms are largely responsible for 
the recent rise in inequalities, as suggested by the different historical experiences of the 
1960s-1970s and 1980s-2000s.  
 
6. Financial globalization, reforms and inequality 
A modern market economy cannot live without a properly functioning financial 
system. According to economic theory, the role of financial markets is the allocation of 
otherwise  unproductive  savings  to  investment  projects,  positively  contributing  to 
economic growth and welfare. The rapid development of the world economy since the 
Industrial  Revolution  owes  a  great  deal  to  domestic  and  international  finance  but 
financial markets have also been a source of economic instability and crisis as shown by  
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the fundamental works of Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009). The patterns of global imbalances, discussed among others in Clarida (2007), 
Fiorentini (2011), Fiorentini and Montani (2010), Wolf (2008), and the recent sequence 
of regional international financial crises eventually going global in 2007-8, proves that 
the  current  functioning  of  financial  markets  is  far  from  perfect.  The  dual  nature  of 
finance explains why regulatory and supervisory institutions were set up, although the 
history  of  capitalism  is  one  of  alternating  phases  of  regulation  and  deregulation. 
Prudential regulation and the supervision of banks and stock exchanges by central banks 
and other institutions such as the SEC in the USA were introduced in order to avoid 
fraud and minimize the likelihood financial institutes defaulting and, in the case of 
default,  to  prevent  contagion,  which  might  threaten  the  systemic  stability  of  the 
economy. On occasions, government and monetary authorities over-regulated, imposing 
interest  rate  ceilings  or  credit  rationing.  These  measures  interfere  with  the  proper 
functioning of monetary and financial markets and distort fund allocation, so nowadays 
the  liberalization  of  domestic  monetary  and  financial  markets  is  generally  accepted 
because it reduces the distortions of over-regulation. Looking back to the events of the 
last decade, it is clear on the other hand that deregulation went too far. In the USA the 
Glass-Steagall Act separating the activities of commercial and investment banks was 
partly repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, allowing US banks to widen 
the  range  of  their  activities,  covering  new  fields  and  fostering  credit  default  swaps 
(CDS)  and  financial  derivatives  increasingly  traded  in  the  non-regulated  over-the-
counter (OTC) market. The negative role of these changes in the global financial crisis 
of 2007-8 is now well-known. Equally dangerous was the SEC decision in 2004 to 
allow  banks  to  raise  their  leverage  ratio  from  10:1  to  30:1,  a  move  that  increased 
systemic risk enormously and, with it, the likelihood of huge losses, which materialized 
in 2008. 
In relation to the liberalization of international capital flows, as already noted, in 
the Bretton Woods period the expansion of international trade was accompanied by 
limited international capital mobility. In a fixed or quasi-fixed exchange rate system, 
international  capital  mobility  is  impeded  because  central  banks  are  not  able  to 
simultaneously target domestic money supply and maintain exchange rate parities in the 
event of massive capital flight. Because flexible exchange rate systems are compatible  
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with high capital mobility, it is no surprise that after the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods  exchange  rate  system  in  1971,  international  capital  flows  and  financial 
globalization  dramatically  increased.  What  is  not  obvious  is  that  opening  domestic 
markets to international financial flows (financial globalization) is always beneficial to 
the countries that implement these policies, especially where the domestic market is not 
suitably reformed. 
One of the elements that differentiates the current phase of globalization from 
the end of the 19
th century is the preeminent role of economic policies and international 
institutions  (IMF,  WB,  WTO)  in  shaping  domestic  reforms  in  favour  of  financial 
openness. Since the end of the 1980s, several developing and emerging medium income 
countries,  pressed  by  advanced  countries,  the  IMF  and  WB  (Stiglitz,  2002)  have 
abolished controls over external capital flows in the hope of gaining more access to 
international capital markets and benefits in terms of investments and higher economic 
growth through financial openness. Financial globalization is thought to exert positive 
effects  partly  because  of  its  disciplining  effect  on  domestic  monetary  and  budget 
policies. In order to attract foreign investments, a government budget has to be ‘in 
order’, inflation under control and interest rates free to adapt to international financial 
market conditions. In turn, lower inflation and the availability of cheaper credit should 
favour low-income households and have a positive effect on inequality. If openness to 
foreign  financial  flows  actually  resulted  in  higher  rates  of  growth  and  less  poverty 
nobody  would  be  against  it.  Empirical  evidence,  however,  shows  that  financial 
globalization has had no significant effect on growth rates. Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2009) estimate that in the period 1970-2004 the correlation coefficient between levels 
of financial globalization and annual average growth rate of GDP per capita in a sample 
of  105  countries  is  virtually  zero  at  a  non  significant  -0.0039365  coefficient.  The 
estimate remains the same even if changes, not levels, of globalization are considered. 
Restricting the analysis to developing countries, Maurice Obstfeld (2009: 63) concludes 
that ‘despite an abundance of cross-sectional, panel and event studies, there is strikingly 
little convincing documentation of direct positive impact of financial opening on the 
welfare levels or growth rates of developing countries’. On the contrary, evidence exists 
that greater financial globalization has had a negative impact on income inequalities 
(Table 5). One explanation of this is that too rapid financial globalization may have  
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weakened domestic financial systems in LDCs rather than producing modernization and 
development. This is consistent with the fact that the frequency of banking and financial 
crises rose dramatically in the 1990s and that, in 1995-2008, they occurred largely in the 
less  developed  non-OECD  countries  (ILO,  2008:  48).  The  crisis  that  hit  several 
medium-income countries in the 1990s followed the removal of controls on foreign 
capital flows in order to attract more international investment. Unfortunately, as the 
case  of  the  Asian  crisis  shows,  short  run  foreign  speculative  investment  and 
mismanagement of foreign loans by domestic banks often increased the vulnerability of 
domestic markets, rather than improving development prospects. In fact, the resulting 
financial turmoil had the strongest negative impact on low income households, so that 
poverty  and  inequality  rose  in  the  countries  hit  by  the  1990s  crisis  (Galbraith  and 
Jiaqing, 1999; World Bank, 2001). There is also evidence that the presence or absence 
of strong social institutions and safety nets made the difference as far as the impact of 
the systemic financial crisis on inequality was concerned (Galbraith and Jiaqing 1999). 
The  chain  of  events  leading  from  increased  financial  openness  to  the  banking  and 
financial crisis and from there to poverty explains why, at the end of the 1990s, several 
countries  in  East  Asia  and  the  Pacific  region  reversed  their  support  for  unlimited 
financial  openness,  reintroducing  capital  controls  and  developing  trade  surpluses  in 
order to accumulate foreign exchange reserves, rather than resorting to international 
capital flows for development purposes (ILO, 2008; Wolf, 2008). The phenomenon of 
global imbalances with its paradoxical ‘uphill’ capital flows from the periphery toward 
the core US economy, was partly caused by the damage produced in the 1990s by 
financial liberalization in non-OECD countries. 
Another  channel  through  which  financial  openness  has  negatively  affected 
within-country income inequality is related to the political dimension of globalization. 
In general, the decision to open a domestic market to foreign financial flows is part of a 
broader  package  of  economic  and  political  reforms,  which  in  many  cases  also 
negatively  affect  income  equality.  Following  the  prescription  of  the  ‘Washington 
Consensus’, in order to ‘attract’ foreign investors, many governments lowered tax rates 
on  financial  investments,  reduced  progressive  taxation,  privatized  State-owned 
companies and utilities and reformed the labour market, introducing more ‘flexible’ 
contracts along with softening or repealing minimum wage laws. The effect of this set  
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of  reforms  has  generally  been  a  loss  of  bargaining  power  of  Trade  Unions,  a 
compression of wages, a reduction of the wage share of GDP, a shift of the tax burden 
from financial companies to industrial companies and from high-income households to 
medium and low income households. One consequence of the reforms is to limit the 
role of governments in income redistribution policies, a fact that often goes hand in 
hand with the contraction of welfare systems and social safety nets (Cornia 2003; ILO, 
2008; OECD, 2008). One simple way to assess the distributional role of Government is 
to compare pre-tax with after-tax income inequality. OECD data (2008) show that the 
latter  is  lower,  confirming  the  importance  of  government  policies.  However,  fiscal 
redistribution in the last two decades has not kept pace with the increase in inequalities. 
The ILO (2008: 136) estimates that in developed countries, where fiscal redistribution 
in the late 1990s increased on average by 2.5 per cent, the overall private Gini index 
increased by 3.4 per cent, with a net increase in income inequality. The situation in 
developing countries is even worse, since an adequate direct tax collection system is 
often  lacking  so  indirect  taxation  yields  the  bulk  of  government  revenues.  Reform 
packages including fiscal reforms that attenuate the progressive nature of direct taxation, 
along  with  the  already  high  level  of  indirect  taxes  whose  regressive  nature  is  well 
known, increase the tax burden on low income individuals and households producing a 
deterioration  in  income  distribution.  Social  transfers  are  an  additional  powerful 
mechanism for achieving fairer income distribution and reforms that privatize public 
services  and  reduce  welfare  provisions  exacerbates  income  inequality.  Trade 
liberalization and tariff reductions in developing countries also reduce the availability of 
resources for financing social transfer programs.  
The pressure that financial globalization exerts on domestic policies is not restricted to 
developing countries. In advanced countries, the reduction of pension benefits and so-
called ‘structural reform’ of the labour market aimed at improving competitiveness were 
already being called for before the global financial crisis. In the USA and EU countries, 
one unpleasant consequence of the crisis has been the rapid growth of government debts 
due to the public bail-out of private banks and a fall in tax revenues caused by a fall in 
GDP. In the EU, in 2007 the average public debt/GDP ratio was below the Maastricht 
limit of 60 per cent, but three years later, in 2010 it rose from 59 to 80 per cent (Eurostat, 
Table tsieb090). In the same period, federal debt almost doubled in the USA, jumping  
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from  35.7  to  61.3  per  cent  of  GDP  (OECD,  Main  Economic  Indicators)  while  the 
overall gross government debt increased from 61.3% to 94.3% (IMF, World Economic 
Outlook Database). The private credit bubble which caused the crisis has turned into a 
sovereign debt crisis because the international financial market, the ‘invisible Leviathan’ 
at  the  origin  of  the  world  crisis,  saved  by  government  intervention,  paradoxically 
quickly turned its speculative attention to indebted EU countries. So far, the political 
response of EU governments and institutions has largely been inadequate and mainly 
based  on  restrictive  domestic  budget  policies  which  alone  can  only  deepen  the 
economic and fiscal crisis in the absence of growth. It seems that the survival of the 
European  Monetary  Union  and  the  economic  and  social  model  which  guaranteed 
decades of peaceful growth and social security in Europe is now seriously threatened. 
The huge expansion of financial flows in an international environment lacking adequate 
international  regulatory  and  supervisory  mechanisms  means  the  problems  of  global 
economic instability and growing inequality cannot be solved at the national level. New 
supranational rules and cooperative solutions are called for (Fiorentini and Montani, 
2010).  
    




 /.∀),7  9  97  9   03  (   9  9  /,( ∋  = ΒΒΧ>9 Α ∀   %#&&−  )(. (. )      (.    ∀()&)!#  & 
 ∀ (! 8  (  ∋∗#,#  &  2∗&), .#)(9Α       &)∀ %   ∋ )   )  ∗7 =ϑϑΕΙ>9 
  ,!7  9  9  (   9  9  −.,3 = ΒΧΧ>9 Α ( +/ &#.3  (   (−/−. ( # &   ,)1.∀8  1)  #   )  .∀    ∋  
 )#(;Α      +      ∗ ,∗∗ &%  &+ 7 =ΧΧ<Βϑ>7  Β9 
  ,!∀7  9  (   9  #&−−)( = ΒΧΒ>9 Α )  #  , &#4 .#)(  (   &)  &#4 .#)(  ( ,  −   ),&   ( +/ &#.3;Α 
 ,)&∋  %  &,)% # &   &# +   #   &%&∃07  Η=Φ>7 Φϑϑ:ΓΒΓ9 
 #, 7  9 = ΒΒΧ>9 Α     ,)!, ∋−8  )  ∀ 3  ),%;   (  ∀ 3          ),%   .. ,;Α  &)#  
  − #&∋∃ %+7  Κ=ΧΧ>7 ΧϑΦΚ:ΗΓ9 
 )&&57  9 = ΒΒϑ>9 Α ( +/ &#.# −  (   #( ( # &  &)  &#4 .#)(8    #∋ &3   ∗),.9Α  %+ )% + &% #    &,) 
  −  .7 ΧΦΙ=Φ>7 ΦΕΕ:Εϑ9 
 ), )7  9  9 = ΒΒΒ>9 Α ∀   (. ,( .#)( &  )( . ,3  /( 8  .−  , − (.  )&  #(  3−.),#  &   ,−∗  .#0 9Α 
      &)∀ %   ∋ )   )  ∗7 =ΙΙ Φ>9 
 ,3 (7  9  9  (   9   ,.#( 4 = ΒΒϑ>9 Α ( .∀   0)&/.#)( )   ( )∋   ( +/ &#.3 #( .∀   (#.    . . −9Α 
  &%&∃    , + )#07 ΚΦ= >7 ΚΙ:Χ Β9 
  &#%7  9  (   9   −  − = ΒΧΒ>9 Α )1  ) −  &)  &#4 .#)(      .  ( )∋   ( +/ &#.3;     ( &   .  
 ( &3−#−9Α  %+ )% + &% #   − %  ∗  %   &%&∃     ∗  )  7 ΧΗ=Φ>7 ΕΓϑ:ΙΒ9 
 & ,#  7  9  9 =  >9  ΒΒΙ9  9  ,)) %+    &,%+  ∃  # %  ∗3  ,∗+  %   # +0  %    !,∗+∃ %+9  ∀#  !)8 
 ∀   #0 ,−#.3 )   ∀#  !)  , −−9 
 ),(# 7  9  9 = ΒΒΕ>9 Α ∀   ∋∗  . )   #  , &#− .#)(  (   &)  &#− .#)( )(  ( )∋   ( +/ &#.3 #( 
  0 &)∗#(!  (   , (−#.#)( &   )()∋# −9Α      &  &)∀ %    ∋ )7 =ϑΦΕ>9 
  0# −7  9  97  9   ( −.,)∋7  9  ∀),,) %−  (   9  9  )&  = ΒΧΧ>9 Α ∀    0 &  (   #−.,# /.#)( )   &)  & 
 )/− ∀)&     &.∀9Α       &%&∃    &,)% #7 Χ Χ=  , ∀>7   Ε:ΓΦ9 
  0,)3 7  9  (   9  9  ,  ∋ ( = ΒΒΧ>9 Α ) −  ( +/ &#.3 #(  %#&&−  2∗& #(−  ( +/ &#.3 #(   ,(#(!− 
  ,)−−   0 (     )/(.,# −;Α       &)∀ %   ∋ )   )  ∗7 ϑΧΦΒ9 
 , ∀ ,7  9  (   9   −.)( = ΒΒϑ>9 Α  −  &)  &#4 .#)(  ( ,  −    ( +/ &#.3;Α   −  . &   %+ )% + &% # 
  &%&∃  ∗7 ΧΗ=Ε>7 ΓΧΗ:ΕΗ9 
 3 (7  9  97  9  %#(( ,  (   9  9   &  − = ΒΒΦ>9 Α ) .∀   # ∀   0   ), ;Α  &,)% # &   &# +   #   &%&∃07 
ΧΧ = >7 ΕΚΙ:ΦΦΦ9 
 #), (.#(#7  9  (   9  )(. (# = ΒΧΒ>9 Α &)  &  ∋  & (  −  (  .∀   , (−#.#)( .)    3∋∋ .,#   ),&  
 )( . ,3  3−. ∋9Α   )∗∋  + −  &%     ) # ∗∃7  =Χ>7 Χ:Φ 9 
 &),#)7  9 = ΒΒ >9 Α  )()∋#−.−7  ,#0 .#− .#)( #(  /−−#   (  .∀    (#(! )  .∀  ≅  −∀#(!∀.)( 
 )(− (−/−≅9Α   −  . &   %+ )% + &% #  &# +      &%&∃07 Κ= >7 ΕΓΚ:ΦΒΒ9 
  & , #.∀7  9  (   9  # +#(! =ΧΚΚΚ>9 Α ( +/ &#.3  (   #( ( # &  ,#−#−8  )∋    ,&3  #( #(!−9Α      
 &)∀ %    ∋ )7 =Κ>9  
  26 
 )&   ,!7  9  9  (   9   0 (#% = ΒΒΙ>9 Α #−.,# /.#)( &      .− )   &)  &#4 .#)( #(   0 &)∗#(! 
 )/(.,# −9Α  &,)% # &    &%&∃     + ) +,) 7 ΦΓ=Ε>7 ΕΚ:ϑ 9 
 (. ,( .#)( &7  9  9 = ΒΒϑ>9  &)#  &   &)∀   ∋&)+ 766:9   ( 0 8  (. ,( .#)( &    )/,  ,! (#4 .#)(9 
  /)∋).. 7  97  9   &&  (   9   ∗ ! ),!#)/ = ΒΒϑ>9 Α #−#(!  ( )∋   ( +/ &#.38    ∀()&)!3 ),  ,    
 (   #( ( # &  &)  &#4 .#)(;Α      &)∀ %    ∋ )7 =ΧϑΓ>9 
 ),! (−)(7  9  9  (   9  / = ΒΒΓ>9 Α ( ),∋ .#)(    %()&)!3  (  .∀   ),&    )()∋39Α 
   %  % −  %  &,)% # &    %&∃  ∗7 ΧΒΙ=Φ>7 ΗΕΧ:ΓΒ9 
 #( &   ,! ,7  9  9  (   9  )  ,. = ΒΒΓ>9   %  ∗2   %    %   ) ∗  ∗3     ∗+&)0 &    % %   #  ) ∗ ∗ 8+  
   + &%9   &!, 0     ∋#&& (9 
 & #(7  9  (   9  )∋ , = ΒΒΧ>9       .  ,∗∗  3  ) %∗ + &%  &%   .)09  . (  ), 8  . (  ),  
 (#0 ,−#.3  , −−9 
  1, (  7  9  9 = ΒΒϑ>9  #,   &## )  #, ∗3  ∗  )    +&  # ∃   &)   ∗ %      % &∃   % (, # +05 
  −∀#(!∀.)(  9 98   . ,−)(  (−.#./.   ),  (. ,( .#)( &   )()∋# −9 
 #(  ,.7  9  9  (   9  9  #&&# ∋(−)( = ΒΒΧ>9 Α ) −  &)  &#4 .#)(   %  .∀   ),&   ),   ( +/ &;Α 
      &)∀ %   ∋ )   )  ∗7 ϑ  ϑ9 
 /,( ( 7  9  97  9  9  #&& .  (   9   03 =ΧΚΚΓ>9 Α ∀   ,)1#(!  ∋∗),. (   )   )!(#.#0   %#&&− #(   !  
  . ,∋#( .#)(9Α       &)∀ %   ∋ )   )  ∗7 =ΓΒΙΗ>9 
  −.  & 7  9 = ΒΒΚ>9 Α (. ,( .#)( &  #( (    (   ,)1.∀ #(   0 &)∗∗#(!  )/(.,# −8  ∀ .   0     
   ,(  ;Α      +      ∋ )∗7 ΓΗ=Χ>7 ΗΕ:ΧΧΧ9 
     = ΒΒϑ>9  )&. %   % (, #5  % &∃    ∗+)  ,+ &%  %   &− )+0  %       &,%+)  ∗9   ,#−8     9 
???? = ΒΧΧ >9   −         + % 3   0  % (, # +0    ∋   ∗ % 9   ,#−8     9 
???? = ΒΧΧ >9 Α ,)1#(!  ( )∋   ( +/ &#.3 #(       )/(.,# −8  ∀ .  ,#0 −  .  (   )1   (  )&# 3 
   %&   .;7Α   ,#−8     7 ΧΦ9 
  &∋ 7  9  9 = ΒΒΗ>9 Α &)  &#4#(!  ( +/ &#.38 ≅  (.,# /! &≅  (  ≅  (.,#∗ . &≅  ),  −  .  ),%9Α      
 &)∀ %     ∋ )7 =ΕΓ>7  Ε9 
 ,4 −1),−%#7  9  (   9  9  ,  & (  = ΒΒ >9 Α ∀       .− )       ,)!, ∋− )(   )()∋#   ,)1.∀9Α 
 &,)% # &    − #&∋∃ %+   &%&∃  ∗7 Η 7 ΕϑΦ:Φ Χ9 
 /, −∀#7  9  9  (   9   ( = ΒΒϑ>9 Α #−.,# /.#)( &  )(− +/ (  − )   &)  &#4 .#)(8  ∋∗#,#  & 
 0#  (    ,)∋   ( &   . 9Α  &,)% # &    − #&∋∃ %+  +,   ∗7 ΦΦ=ΧΒ>7 ΧΦ Φ:ΦΚ9 
  ∃ (7  9  9 = ΒΧΒ>9   ,#+   % ∗9  ,#(  .)(8  ,#(  .)(  (#0 ,−#.3  , −−9 
  # ∀7  9  9 = ΒΧΒ>9   + )∗ & ∀9   1  ),%8  & ,    9  ()∗ 9 
  #(∀ ,.7  9  9  (   9  9  )!)   = ΒΒΚ>9    ∗   ∃   ∗      ) %+9  ,#(  .)(8  ,#(  .)(  (#0 ,−#.3  , −−9 
 ) ,#%7  9  (   9  / , ∋ (# ( = ΒΒΚ>9 Α ∀3  #   #( ( # &  &)  &#4 .#)(  #− ∗∗)#(.;Α      +    
  ∋ )∗7 ΓΗ=Χ>7 ΧΧ :Εϑ9 
 .#!&#.47  9  9 = ΒΒ >9  #&  # 1 + &%  %   +∗   ∗ &%+ %+∗9  9 9  ),.)(  (   )∋∗ (39 
 &/  −)!&/7  9  9 = ΒΒΦ>9 Α &)  &#− .#)(  (   ( +/ &#.39Α      ,∗+) #  %   &%&∃     −  .7 ΕΙ=Χ>7 
ΧΧΗ:  9  
  27 
 #&&# ∋−)(7  9 =  >9 ΧΚΚΒ9   + %  ∃ )      !,∗+∃ %+3  &.  ,     ∗   ∋∋ %  5   . ,−)(  (−.#./.  
 ),  (. ,( .#)( &   )()∋# −9 
 )& 7  9 = ΒΒϑ>9   / %   #&  #   % %  9   1   &   (   )( )(8   &   (#0 ,−#.3  , −−9 
 )&  7  9 = ΒΧΒ>9 Α    (.  , ( − #(  )/− ∀)& −    &.∀ #( .∀   (#.    . . −8  #−#(!    .  (  .∀  
 #  & : & −−  +/  4 : (  ∗  .  .)  ΒΒΙ9Α   −0   &%&∃    %∗+ +,+   &)∀ %    ∋ ∗7 ΓϑΚ9 
 )) 7  9 =ΧΚΚΚ>9 Α ∗ ( −−  (    !   ( +/ &#.3 #(   0 &)∗#(!  )/(.,# −8  ∀    .#(  ∋ ,#   
 ∀ && (!  .)   −.  −# (  )(0 (.#)( &  #− )∋7Α #(  9   & 1#(7  9  )∀ (  (   9   ∗#, =  −>7 
  )∀ +  %+  ) + &%2     &% # ∗∃  %  +    #&  #   &%&∃04   1  ),%  (    & )/,( 8 
  ∋ ,# !   (#0 ,−#.3  , −−7 ΧΓΕ:ϑΧ9 
 ),& 7  9 = ΒΒΧ>9  &)#    − #&∋∃ %+   ∋&)+9   −∀#(!.)(  9 98  ∀   ),&    (%9 
 ),&    (% = ΒΒΧ>9  &)#    − #&∋∃ %+   ∋&)+9   −∀#(!.)(  9 98  ∀   ),&    (%9 
 
    
  28 
 
Table 1: The Gini index for selected countries 
Country  Gini index  Year* 
Albania  31.2  2004 
Argentina  50.3  2005 
Bangladesh  33.2  2004 
Bolivia  50.4  2004 
Brazil  56.4  2004 
China  37.2  2002 
Egypt  34.4  2004 
Finland  26  2006 
France  27  2006 
Germany  27  2006 
India  36.8  2004 
Italy  32  2006 
Nigeria  43.7  2003 
South Africa  56.5  2000 
UK  32  2006 
USA  46.4  2004 
Source: UNI/WIDER Income Inequality Database WIID2c (2008).  
*Year depends on availability and reliability of data. 
 
Table 2: pre-tax Gini index trends in 15 OECD countries  
  1975  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005 
Australia         1.00  1.02  0.98 
Belgium     1.00  1.03  1.05  1.03   
Canada  1.00  1.04  1.08  1.11  1.11  1.16 
Denmark     1.00  1.06  1.12  1.11  1.12 
Finland  1.00  0.97  1.05  1.14  1.13  1.13 
France     1.00  0.97  0.92  0.95  0.92 
Germany     1.00  0.95  1.04  1.08  1.15 
Italy     1.00  1.04  1.21  1.23  1.33 
Japan     1.00  1.08  1.17  1.25  1.28 
Netherlands  1.00  1.11  1.11  1.14  1.00  1.00 
New Zealand     1.00  1.15  1.20  1.19  1.16 
Norway     1.00  1.06  1.13  1.17  1.22 
Portugal  1.00  0.98  0.95  1.07  1.05   
Sweden  1.00  1.04  1.05  1.13  1.15  1.11 
United 
Kingdom 
1.00  1.24  1.30  1.34  1.35  1.30 
United States  1.00  1.08  1.13  1.20  1.20  1.22 
OECD-15     1.00  1.05  1.10  1.10  1.12 
Source: OECD Statlinks http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/420718178732. 
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Table 3: US inter quintile ratios of income distribution in the period 1968 – 2004 
  Q5/Q1  Q5/Q3  Q3/Q1 
1968  10.19  1.75  4.17 
1972   10.71    1.79    4.17  
1976   9.84    1.75    3.89  
1980   10.16    1.76    3.93  
1984   10.95    1.82    4.00  
1988   12.18    1.91    4.21  
1992   12.34    1.94    4.16  
1996   13.24    2.10    4.08  
2000   13.78    2.16    4.14  
2004   14.74    2.16    4.32  
Source: UNI/WIDER Income Inequality Database WIID2c (2008) 
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Table 5: Results of selected studies on globalization and income inequality 
  Effects on within-country income inequality 
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Figure 1: Gini index for income inequality in the USA (1967 – 2004) 
 
Source: UNI/WIDER Income Inequality Database WIID2c (2008) 
Figure 2: Income share of the top 1% of the population 
 
Source: OECD Statlinks http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/420757184562 
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